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It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become
encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to
provoke further analysis.
-Hyde and Schneider v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391
(1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
I. Introduction
The dean of this generation of federal courts scholars has duly
noted:
There is no more controversial doctrine in the federal courts
today than the doctrine of 'Our Federalism,' which teaches that
federal courts must refrain from hearing constitutional chal-
lenges to state action under certain circumstances in which
federal action is regarded as an improper intrusion on the right
of the state to enforce its laws in its own courts.'
This statement proved true once again in the decision of the
Supreme Court in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,2 an important
recent extension of the doctrine of "Our Federalism." This Article
evaluates Pennzoil in an effort to provoke further analysis of the
principle underlying the doctrine of "Our Federalism."
Most law review writing exists more to be written than to be
read and then only to be read by other members of the academy.
Not so with this Review and this Article. Anticipating a reader-
ship of practicing lawyers, of litigators, gives me pause, I must
admit. My assignment to write about "Our Federalism" seems to
deal with a rather arcane topic in federal jurisdiction. My hope
here is to demonstrate just how important and how practical the
doctrine is so that some lawyer in some federal court somewhere
might participate better in the lawmaking partnership between the
bench and the bar. Charles Dickens, who once worked in a law
office, observed, "[w]e lawyers are always curious, always inquisi-
tive, always picking up odds and ends for our patchwork minds,
since there is no knowing when and where they may fit into some
comer ..
1. C. WRioGH, TE LAw oF FEDERAL CoumrS 320 (4th ed. 1983).
2. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
3. C. DicrEss, Liule Dorritt, in THE WoRKs OF CHARLEs DiCKEs 182 (1857).
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My purpose then is to get behind the slogan, "Our Fed-
eralism," to place it in the context of abstention doctrines general-
ly, to trace the evolution of this particular variety of abstention,
to focus on Pennzoil and its aftermath, and to speculate about the
future of this doctrine that has so intrigued courts, commentators,
and counsel.
II. The Doctrine of "Our Federalism"
A. Abstention Generally
"It is a principle of first importance that the federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction." From the time of the Framers, the
federal jurisdiction inquiry has been twofold: first, to determine
whether a case comes within the judicial power of article .II of
the Constitution; and second, to determine whether the case comes
within some particular enabling act of Congress
The Supreme Court has made it plain that "[a]bstention from
the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule."'
The abstention doctrines, therefore, identify circumstances in
which a federal court possessed of constitutional and statutory
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case nonetheless may
"abstain"--by either dismissing or staying the federal proceeding-
in deference to a state tribunal.
The various abstention doctrines differ in their requirements
and their consequences. Some uncertainty exists about whether
there are several abstention doctrines or one doctrine with several
applications." In Pennzoil, the plurality cautioned, "The various
4. C. Wmoror, supra note 1, at 22.
5. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440, 442 (1850) (federal courts can exer-
cise jurisdiction if authorized by congressional statute and the Constitution); Hodgson and
Thompson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809) (a statute cannot extend the
jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the limits of the Constitution); Ex parte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807) (the Court disclaimed all jurisdiction not given by the
Constitution or by the laws of the United States).
6. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1976); cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (dictum) ("We have
no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given... . [W]e find this tribunal invested with appellate jurisdiction in
all cases arising under the [C]onstitution and laws of the United States.").
7. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477 (1977)
("two primary types"); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
1990]
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types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal
courts must try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a complex of con-
siderations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that
contemplates parallel judicial processes."8  Eminent scholars of
federal practice have made the additional point that "[t]he number
of categories into which the abstention cases are divided is of little
significance."9 For present purposes, the situations justifying
federal court abstention may be grouped into four categories for
brief identification. °
U.S. 800, 814 (1976) ("three general categories"); County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959) ("the doctrine of abstention").
8. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 fi.9 (1987).
9. 17 C. WRIrHT, A. MiLt. & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAcrcE AND PRocEDuRE § 4241,
at 28 (1988).
10. See E. CHEmEInSKY, FEDERAL JUIsDIcFiON 593-676 (1989); R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK,
& J. YOUNG, TREATSE ON Co NsTrTrnONAL LAW § 2.15, at 161-81 (1986); C. Wraar, supra
note 1, at 302-30; see also Baker, Thinking About Federal Jurisdiction-of Serpents and
Swallows, 17 ST. MARY's L.J. 239, 249-52 (1986); Baker, Federal Jurisdiction, 16 Tax.
TEcH L. Rnv. 145, 175-79 (1985).
During this writing, the Federal Courts Study Committee considered a proposal to
render the Younger doctrine inapplicable to actions for damages but to leave it otherwise
unimpaired as a nonjurisdictional limit on the power of federal courts to enjoin state
courts. The other abstention doctrines would have been codified as follows:
(a) A federal court may, in its discretion, abstain from deciding a case otherwise
within its jurisdiction if:
(1) there is substantial uncertainty regarding the meaning or interpretation
of a state law that is fairly subject to an interpretation that will render unnecessary
a ruling on a federal constitutional issue; or
(2) the case involves a challenge to an order or other action of a state ad-
ministrative agency and the state courts have a policy-making, quasi-administra-
tive role in reviewing agency decisions; or
(3) exercising jurisdiction will unnecessarily duplicate ongoing state
proceedings that are far advanced and no special circumstances necessitate ad-
judication in a federal forum.
(b) In exercising its discretion under subsection (a) of this section, the court
shall consider the nature of the federal claim and the likelihood that abstaining
will produce excessive delay in its determination.
(c) The court shall, whenever possible, certify a question of state law upon
which abstention is ordered to an appropriate state court for prompt resolution.
The plaintiff may reserve the right to return to federal court to have any federal
issues adjudicated.
(d) Subsections (a)(1) and (2) shall not apply if jurisdiction over the state law
issue is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Proposal from Subcommittee on Role and the Relationship Between State and Federal
Courts (Feb. 19-20, 1990). The Committee's final report recommended further study but
took no position on this proposal. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY Co mTrrEE 48
(Apr. 2, 1990).
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1. Pullman Abstention.-The oldest and most clearly defined
category of abstention was created by the Supreme Court in Rail-
road Commission v. Pullman Co." The plaintiffs challenged the
validity of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission under state
law and under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. Be-
cause the state-law issue was uncertain and could be controlling to
obviate the federal constitutional issue, the Supreme Court unani-
mously ruled that the federal trial should be stayed to allow the
parties to obtain a definitive ruling on the state-law issue from a
state court. 2 This stay would serve the interest of federalism and
perhaps avoid an unnecessary constitutional adjudication. Thus, in
the classic Pullman abstention, the plaintiff alleges a constitutional
violation as well as a pendent claim under state law. To avoid an
unnecessary determination of the constitutional issue, the district
court abstains, thereby allowing the parties to obtain a controlling
ruling on the ambiguous issue of state law. The rationale governing
this category of abstention is to defer to state courts on state-law
issues-a judge-created Erie"3 approach with a vengeance.
The Pullman abstention often has been invoked in civil rights
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) challenging the con-
stitutionality of state action in which pendent state-law claims are
joined. 14 One subcategory of mandatory Pullman abstention inter-
prets the eleventh amendment to require state courts to decide cer-
tain issues of state law even though a federal court exercises
jurisdiction over the remainder of the case. 5 For either category
to apply, the state law must be "unclear," so that abstaining is not
merely a delay toward some inevitable ruling; it is not clear just
11. 312 U.S. 496 (1941); see Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope
of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. Ray. 1071 (1974); Note, Federal Court
Abstention in Diversity of Citizenship Cases, 62 S. CAi. L. REv. 1237 (1989).
12. 312 U.S. at 501.
13. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts apply state sub-
stantive law in cases involving state law).
14. See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (federal court should have
abstained from deciding the merits of the issues tendered to it and should have retained
jurisdiction until Virginia courts had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to construe
them).
15. See Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
(eleventh amendment bars federal courts from ordering state officers to conform their be-
havior to state law).
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how unclear the state law must be.'6 Pullman abstention may not
be in order if there are compelling reasons for prompt federal
adjudication or if the state remedy is somehow inadequate. 8
Today, I would suggest that the Younger doctrine 9 has all but dis-
placed Pullman abstention. Nonetheless, Pullman abstention has
content in federal suits brought before a state law has been violated
or when the state enactment being challenged does not involve
state enforcement. In such situations, other preliminary concerns
for justiciability remain, for example, standing and ripeness.
The procedure in Pullman abstention is somewhat odd. At
the time of federal court abstention, no parallel state proceeding
exists. The plaintiff is directed to file an action in state court on
the state-law claims-usually the prudent approach is to seek a
declaratory judgment. In state court, the plaintiff may litigate both
the state-law issue and the constitutional issue or choose to litigate
only the state-law issue by reserving the right to return to the
federal court if resolving the state law issue does not obviate the
constitutional issue.2" Usually, the federal court will simply enter
an order staying the federal proceedings, but it may dismiss the
matter without prejudice to circumvent state-law limitations on ad-
16. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (abstention from
Pullman doctrine was unnecessary, since there was no uncertain question of state law
under Hawaii's Land Reform Act of 1967); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (the
district court should have abstained from deciding the constitutional issue until the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court clarified the meaning of a 1974 Massachusetts statute
concerning abortion); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (since the state
statute at issue was unambiguous and there was no uncertain issue of state law, the federal
court properly proceeded to decide the federal constitutional claim).
17. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (abstention was inap-
propriate in case involving first amendment challenge to a municipal ordinance that made
it unlawful to interrupt police officers in the performance of their duties).
18. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (federal court intervention
was necessary to prevent a substantial impairment of freedom of expression resulting from
state prosecution under an overly broad state statute regulating expression); Baggett v.
Builitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (federal courts do not automatically abstain when faced with
a doubtful issue of state law, particularly where first amendment freedoms are implicated).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 35-60.
20. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
Whether the state court's findings of facts should be given preclusive effect upon return
to the federal forum is an open question. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)
(nothing in the language or legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 denies binding effect
to a state court judgment when the state court gives parties a fair and full opportunity to
litigate federal claims and shows itself willing to protect federal rights).
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visory opinions."' Alternatively, an appellate litigant can wait to
obtain an advisory opinion through the mechanics of certification
on the state-law issue from the highest court of the state.' This
procedure may significantly reduce the expense and delay of ob-
taining an authoritative interpretation of state law.
2. Burford Abstention.-The Pullman category is easier to
define than the next category, which derives its name from Burford
v. Sun Oil Co.' In general, Burford allowed the federal court to
defer to a state's administration of important state policy and to
avoid unnecessary interference and disruption of the state govern-
ment scheme.' Thus, the rationale for Burford abstention is dif-
ferent from the rationale for Pullman abstention, although the effect
of requiring the plaintiff to initiate a state proceeding is the same.
Burford abstention is invoked more typically in cases that do not
involve federal questions. Because no federal issue exists to justify
a jurisdiction-retaining stay in the district court, the proper federal
disposition is to dismiss the case outright, particularly given the
assurance, at least in theory, of Supreme Court review of any sig-
nificant federal issue.
Furthermore, Burford abstention does not apply when a suit
is filed first in federal court and state administrative remedies have
not been exhausted. There is no requirement to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies in suits under § 1983.' The Burford
decision may be its own best example. In Burford, the Supreme
Court ruled that the district court should have abstained in a dis-
pute over the apportionment of oil drilling rights because Texas
had established an overall plan of regulation by a state commission
with specified state procedures for judicial review. 6 The two keys
21. See Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1975).
22. See, e.g., Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383 (1988)
(Supreme Court certified questions concerning construction of a Virginia state statute to
the Virginia Supreme Court since resolution of these questions would assist the Court in
its review of first amendment claims). For the procedure of certification to the Texas
Supreme Court, see TEx. R. App. P. 114.
23. 319 U.S. 315 (1943); see Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention: Clarifying
the Roles of State and Federal Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAvis L. Rnv. 1
(1986); Comment, Abstention by Federal Courts in Suits Challenging State Administrative
Decisions: The Scope of the Burford Doctrine, 46 U. Cm. L. RPv. 971 (1979).
24. 319 U.S. at 334.
25. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (exhaustion of state ad-
ministrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
26. 319 U.S. at 333-34.
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in the state regulatory scheme in Burford were the existence of
complex, specialized factual issues and the central importance of
concentrated state judicial review. Burford abstention is pure
federalism. It is used sparingly, however, because rarely are the
circumstances such that a state interest would be unduly impaired
by a federal court deciding a case otherwise in its jurisdiction.27
The Supreme Court has never satisfactorily explained which state
administrative schemes deserve Burford abstention. Consequently,
this doctrine may be invoked whenever the exercise of federal
jurisdiction arguably disrupts some state administrative procedure,
even when the state agency is alleged to be violating federal law.
3. Colorado River Abstention.-The third category of absten-
tion serves quite different and somewhat less lofty purposes.
Rather than avoiding unnecessary constitutional discussions or
respecting state sovereignty, the abstention doctrine from Colorado
River Water Conservation District v. United States28 "rest[s] on con-
siderations of [w]ise judicial administration." 9 This doctrine was
developed in the inferior federal courts to conserve scarce judicial
resources in the onslaught of burgeoning dockets. ° The Supreme
Court has refined a factorial analysis to determine case-by-case
when Colorado River abstention is appropriate.' The typical situa-
tion involves both a pending state proceeding and a federal proceed-
ing involving parallel claims and parties; furthermore, no
constitutional (Pullman abstention) or federalism (Burford absten-
tion) complications are present. Yet, abstention still may be in
27. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
815 (1976) (Burford abstention unnecessary because the state law to be applied is fairly
well settled); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959) (no
exceptional circumstances to justify abstention).
28. 424 U.S. 800 (1976); see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Con-
str. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (a federal district court's decision to stay or to dismiss a
federal action on grounds of wise judicial administration depends on a careful balancing
of several important factors with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise
of jurisdiction); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1973) (when there is duplica-
tive litigation in state and federal courts, the decision whether to defer to the state courts
is largely committed to the discretion of the district court).
29. 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342
U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).
30. See Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEo.
LJ. 99 (1986).
31. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983).
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order. The factorial analysis developed by the Supreme Court to
determine whether to apply Colorado River abstention considers
whether the state court has already acquired jurisdiction over some
relevant property; how relatively convenient the federal forum is
for the parties; whether piecemeal litigation will be avoided; which
court first obtained jurisdiction and which proceeding is further
along; whether state or federal law provides the rule for decision
on the merits; and whether the state process adequately protects the
plaintiff's federal rights. 2 Federal courts appear more likely to
defer to prior state court proceedings when the state plaintiff has
won the race to the courthouse than when the federal suit was filed
first. Federal discretion is limited to choosing between abstaining
to avoid a wasteful race to judgment or affording a federal plaintiff
the choice of the federal forum.
Application of Colorado River abstention appears to be even
less predictable than the discretion to abstain that this factorial
analysis provides to federal courts. Although the Supreme Court
has equated a stay with a dismissal, a stay is less problematic for
the plaintiff because of the obvious concern for the statute of
limitations.33 Also, issues of preclusion appear more confused here
than elsewhere in federal jurisdiction-if that is possible-par-
ticularly as regards exclusive federal jurisdiction. For present pur-
poses, it is enough to note that plaintiffs who litigate and lose state
claims in state court may be precluded even from bringing an ex-
clusive federal claim in a subsequent federal proceeding.'M
If this categorical treatment of abstention were to end here,
there would not be too much worth noting. The abstention cate-
32. 424 U.S. at 18.
33. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 28-29; Board of Education of
Valley View Community Unit School Dist. No. 365U v. Bosworth, 713 F.2d 1316 (7th
Cir. 1983) (federal district court should stay proceedings rather than dismiss them; if the
state proceedings do not resolve all issues, parties should have access to the federal courts
without the fear that the statute of limitations will have run).
34. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373
(1985) (as a matter of federal law, a plaintiff can bring state law claims initially in state
court only at the cost of forgoing subsequent federal antitrust claims.); Will v. Calvert
Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978). But cf. Andrea Theatres, Inc. v. Theatre Confections,
Inc., 787 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1986) (state courts may not grant affirmative relief based on
claims for which federal jurisdiction is exclusive; federal district court should not have
abstained from hearing antitrust action, since there had been only limited progress in state
court).
1990]
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gories labeled Pullman, Burford, and Colorado River do not
amount to much. They remain relatively narrow and they have
not evolved much beyond their original doctrinal forms. They ac-
count for few decisions and little controversy. The fourth category
of abstention-"Our Federalism"-is not like the others. "Our
Federalism" has grown remarkably to apply to more cases and car-
ries with it the more profound consequence of depriving the
federal plaintiff of any federal forum-before, during, or after the
state proceeding-in which to present a constitutional claim. The
remainder of this Article addresses the complexity and importance
of "Our Federalism."
B. The Younger Decision
The Younger abstention doctrine, sometimes called the non-
intervention doctrine and often described euphemistically as the
doctrine of "Our Federalism," may be traced back to the 1971
Supreme Court decision in Younger v. Harris35 and five companion
cases." The most significant and recent sequel, of course, is the
Pennzoil decision.3"
Before 1971, there were mixed signals from the Supreme
Court whether a federal court could enjoin state court criminal
proceedings, the issue presented in Younger v. Harris." The hold-
ings in the lower federal courts were confused.39 The plaintiff in
Younger had been indicted in state court for distributing leaflets
35. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
36. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 892 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v.
Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). For an inside view of the convoluted decisional history
of this sextet, see B. ScrnwARz, SuPracina 755-57 (1983).
37. See infra Subpart 11(B). The literature on the Younger doctrine is both exhaus-
tive and exhausting. Beyond the sources cited in this Article, there is a selective and
current bibliography at 17 C. Wuorr, A. MI.ER & E. CooPrs, supra note 9, § 4242, at
193 n.1. The textual discussion here relies heavily on E. CHEmERINsKY, supra note 10, at
621-55; P. BAToR, D. Mrz, P. Msamn, & D. S.Amo, Tim FEDERAL Coums AND Thm
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1383-1438 (3d ed. 1988).
38. Compare Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) with Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. - See Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski,
Younger and Beyond, 50 Tax. L. REv. 1324 (1972); Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief
Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. REv. 535
(1970).
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alleged to violate the state criminal syndicalism statute. In federal
court, the plaintiff sued the district attorney under § 1983 asking
for an injunction against the state court prosecution and alleging
a violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. A three-judge
district court agreed with the plaintiff, declared the state statute
unconstitutional on its face as overbroad and vague, and enjoined
any further prosecution.' On direct appeal, the Supreme Court
held that the injunction "must be reversed as a violation of the
national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending
state court proceedings except under special circumstances." '  Jus-
tice Black wrote the opinion for the Court in a discursive style
relying on feckless history.' Considerations of equity and comity
barred relief. Justice Black invoked a "basic doctrine of equity
jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly
should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving
party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable
injury if denied equitable relief."'43 The plaintiff could have raised
his constitutional claims as a defense in the state criminal proceed-
ing. Here Justice Black invoked the notion of comity: "[T]his un-
derlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering
with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital con-
sideration, the notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state
functions." He went on to encapsulate this idea in a kind of
Irving Berlin lyric, "Our Federalism," which he described as a
"recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a
40. 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
41. 401 U.S. at 41.
42. Justice Black was something of an historical positivist.
Portions of the principal opinion in Younger, which was written by Justice Black,
read almost like a patriotic hymn in announcing equitable restraint as a tenet of
"Our Federalism." Justice Black refers to "comity" as if it were a matter of
divine preference; and the phrase "Our Federalism" is coined in such a way as
to suggest that its content is both clear and indisputable. Nonetheless, as written,
the decision in Younger is very limited and the holding is hardly original.
Edwards, The Changing Notion of Our Federalism, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1015, 1015 (1987);
see also Trainor v. Hemandez, 431 U.S. 434, 464 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (ques-
tioning "[t]he majestic language in Mr. Justice Black's Younger opinion"); Redish, The
Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CoRE.L L. REV.
463, 464 (1978) ("a 1940's radio serial").
43. 401 U.S. at 43-44. But see Younger, 281 F. Supp. at 510-11 (finding irreparable
injury and no adequate remedy at law).
44. 401 U.S. at 44.
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Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and
their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions
in their separate ways. ' This was the Americana jurisprudence
of Hugo L. Black. "Our Federalism" was understood to be two-
dimensional-state and federal-and inherent in the structure of
the Constitution. In this manner, Justice Black denied political
victory to both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists:
[Our Federalism] does not mean blind deference to "States
Rights" any more than it means centralization of control over
every important issue in our National Government and its
courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the
concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity
to the legitimate interests of both State and National Govern-
ments, and in which the National Government, anxious though
it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal in-
terests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.46
Nonetheless, Justice Black did admit that in "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" a federal court could enjoin a pending state proceed-
ing.47 The holding in Younger was that an injunction was not
proper merely because the plaintiff invoked the first amendment
in a suit under § 1983. The Court suggested three exceptions to
the Younger abstention doctrine.48 First, a showing of bad-faith
prosecution or harassment would justify immediate injunctive
relief.49 The Supreme Court has never found the predicate show-
ing of bad faith or harassment," and such holdings in the lower
courts are exceedingly rare.' Second, the Court suggested in
45. 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
46. Id. Justice Black's account of 1787 federalism seems to belie his theory of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
47. 401 U.S. at 53-54.
48. See Collins, The Right to Avoid Trial: Justifying Federal Court Intervention into
Ongoing State Court Proceedings, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 49, 60-72 (1987).
49. 401 U.S. at 48-49.
50. See, e.g., Moore v. Simms, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975);
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
51. See 17 C. WRIGHT. A. MmtUER & E. CooPER, supra note 9, § 4255; see also Fiss,
Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1115 n.36 (1977); Wingate, The Bad Faith-Harassment
Exception to the Younger Doctrine: Exploring the Empty Universe, 5 REv. Lrrmo. 123
(1986).
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Younger that a federal court would be justified in restraining a
state prosecution under a statute that was "flagrantly and patently
violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sen-
tence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whom-
ever an effort might be made to apply it."52 The very holding in
Younger runs counter to this exception: two terms before
Younger, the Court had invalidated an almost identical statute, yet
the statute in Younger was not sufficiently unconstitutional. 3 Ad-
ditionally, logically this seems to be a curious exception: there
appears to be less need for federal court intervention when the
merits are so obvious to the state court, unless, perhaps, the logic
is that the interference with the state court is trivial in such an
obvious case. In any event, the Supreme Court has reversed a
holding of flagrant unconstitutionality when the statute could be
nothing else but invalid.' Third, the Younger opinion concluded
that federal issues should be raised in the state tribunal "unless it
plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protec-
tion."55 This exception has some modest content, and the federal
injunction may issue upon a showing of bias in the state tribunal.56
Again, the actual holdings based on this exception have been rare.57
Two other exceptions have been added as postscripts to the
Younger doctrine: federal intervention is proper if the federal
claim cannot be raised in any meaningful way in the state proceed-
ing58 or if the parties waive application of the Younger doctrine.59
52. 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971) (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).
53. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
54. See Trainor v. Hemandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1977). But see Tolbert v. City
of Memphis, 568 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Tenn. 1983).
55. 401 U.S. at 45 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-47 (1926)).
56. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). But see Kugler v. Helfant, 421
U.S. 117 (1975).
57. Justice Stevens believes that Younger abstention should never apply if the con-
stitutional challenge is against the validity of the very state procedures to which the plain-
tiff would be remitted upon federal court abstention. See Trainor, 431 U.S. at 460, 469
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 340-41 (1977) (Stevens, J., con-
curring).
58. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975).
59. A state may expressly urge a federal court to decide the case on the constitutional
merits. See Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 500 n.9 (1984); Swisher v. Brady,
438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978); Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S.
471, 480 (1977); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396-97 n.3 (1975).
1990]
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
Given the empty logic of these exceptions to the Younger
ruling and the rarity of their occurrence, it is understandable why
one Supreme Court critic of the Younger doctrine has argued that
the exceptions require showings that are "probably impossible to
make."' This Article, therefore, is obliged to return to a con-
sideration of the Younger doctrine itself.
C. Related Younger Themes
The Younger decision described a doctrine at the intersection
of a number of themes in federal jurisdiction. Identifying these
themes and how they relate to the abstention principle furthers our
understanding of the doctrine.6'
At one level, the holding in Younger to prohibit a federal court
from enjoining an ongoing state criminal prosecution may be
viewed as a not-so remarkable judicial analog to the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (§ 2283).62 Since 1793, there has been
a statute prohibiting federal courts from enjoining state court
proceedings. Although not a model of drafting,63 § 2283 presently
establishes a rule of prohibition of injunctions with only three ex-
ceptions.' The Younger opinion makes clear, however, that the
abstention doctrine is not based on § 2283.65 In subsequent hold-
ings, in fact, the Supreme Court has applied Younger abstention
when § 2283 does not apply.'
60. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 489, 498 (1977).
61. See generally E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 627-31; Note, Slogan or Sub-
stance? Understanding "Our Federalism" and Younger Abstention, 73 CORNEL. L. Rav.
852 (1988).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
63. "[A]ny amendment should properly solve more questions than it raises. The
[1948] revision [to the Anti-Injunction Act] does not appear to have this virtue." Barrett,
Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in State Courts, 35 CAuF. L. RE V. 545, 563
(1947).
64. "A Court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment." 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1982). See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 631 (1977) (tracing history
of 28 U.S.C. § 2283). See generally Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-
Injunction Statute, 78 COLUM. L. Ray. 330 (1978); Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute
Reconsidered, 44 U. Cu. L. Ray. 717 (1977).
65. 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
66. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619
(1986); see also Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988).
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This statute relates to a second intersecting theme: whether
§ 1983 is an express authorization for injunctions under the terms
of one of the exceptions to the § 2283 prohibition on injunctions.
The Court in Younger did not reach the question, even though the
suit was brought under § 1983,67 but did answer the question in
the affirmative the very next year. In Mitchum v. Foster,' the Court
opined that "the very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the
federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of
the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitu-
tional action under color of state law.6 9 There is a tension be-
tween Younger abstention and the § 1983 jurisdiction. If Younger
is understood to create a bar to injunctive relief independent of
the bar in § 2283, then a § 1983 plaintiff obtains little comfort
from Mitchum, which trumps only § 2283, the Anti-Injunction Act.
And we have seen how the Younger exceptions are antipathetic to
injunctions." Though technically distinct, Mitchum and Younger
pull opposite ways.7' The former encourages federal courts to en-
join state proceedings, whereas the latter discourages such injunc-
tions to the point of rule-proving exceptions that amount to
fantasy. Younger evokes a romanticized federalism of the 1790's
and Mitchum conjures up attitudes of the 1860's."
This raises another point: is Younger a common-law or a con-
stitutional doctrine?" If the Younger holding is common law, then
67. 401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart, J., concurring).
68. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
69. Id. at 242.
This legislative history [of § 1983] makes evident that Congress clearly conceived
that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect
to the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that state instrumen-
talities could not protect those rights; it realized that state officers might, in fact,
be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these failings
extended to the state courts.
Id. See Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6-27 (1985) (quoting Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 48-60.
71. See E. CHaMRINsKY, supra note 10, at 627; see also Soifer & MacGill, The
Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1141 (1977); Zeigler,
A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruc-
tion, 1983 DuKE LJ. 987.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83.
73. See E. CHmamusKy, supra note 10, at 627. There is no small academic issue
of constitutional law that may be raised against the Younger abstention doctrine:
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a specific statute could authorize federal court injunctions against
state court prosecutions. As noted above, the Court in Mitchum
held that § 1983 was an express statutory authorization for such
injunctions.74 Logic compels the conclusion that this explicit con-
gressional authorization trumps the common law, and Younger
would not apply in § 1983 suits, except that Younger, although
decided before Mitchum, was a § 1983 suit. In the alternative, if
Younger is deemed a constitutional doctrine, then, at least, the
Court's logic was flawed to decide the constitutional issue before
addressing the statutory issue whether § 2283 barred relief.
Remember that the Pullman doctrine is based on avoiding unneces-
sary resolution of a constitutional issue. This is a professor's
issue, however, inasmuch as Mitchum, decided the next year, held
that § 1983 was an exception to § 2283. The Supreme Court has
yet to address whether Younger is based on the Constitution or on
common law. It is not much of a criticism today to note that
Younger and Mitchum were decided in the wrong order, except to
note that "[u]nder Younger, Congress's authority is uncertain.""
Generally, abstention may best be conceptualized as a prudential
exercise of judicial discretion in the interpretation of statutes con-
ferring jurisdiction, resembling such principles as limits on stand-
ing, ripeness and mootness or the elaborations of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction.
Justice Black's equity rationale provides another thematic
perspective of the Younger Doctrine. A first-year law school prin-
ciple is that a court will not issue an injunction when there is an
adequate remedy at law. Younger abstention bars a federal court
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it
is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot,
as the -legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of
the Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever
doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if
it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of juris-
diction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we
would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, CJ.). See generally
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
74. 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972).
75. E. CHEmisINsKY, supra note 10, at 628; see Redish, Abstention, Separation of
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L. 71 (1984).
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from issuing an injunction because the state court proceeding is
available for the constitutional issue. This is somewhat procrus-
tean: "[The usual equity maxim relates to refusing injunctions if
money damages are sufficient; it has no direct relevance to one
court refusing to hear an issue because another court can do so."76
Then there is the debate over whether the opportunity to raise con-
stitutional claims in a state court is either an adequate or ap-
propriate substitute for the federal forum." Still, there is no
denying the strength of the countervailing principle of equity to
refrain from enjoining pending criminal prosecutions.78 Honoring
this principle in the Younger situation simultaneously honors
federalism.
Although it is best known as a precedent for interpreting the
eleventh amendment, the enigmatic holding in Ex parte Young79
sounds an important theme related to the Younger doctrine. In that
famous fiction, the Court ruled that the federal suit seeking an in-
junction against enforcement by the Attorney General of a state
regulation was against Attorney General Young for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment, yet, against Mister Young for purposes of
the eleventh amendment." This fiction of federalism made pos-
sible federal equitable intervention in state proceedings, and the
ruling has been "indispensable to the establishment of constitution-
al government and the rule of law."" Younger and Ex parte
Young are two adjustments of federalism existing in open tension.
76. E. CHEMERNSKY, supra note 10, at 628. An adequate remedy at law as a bar to
equitable relief in the federal courts refers to a remedy arising from law rather than equity.
"[l]t was never a doctrine of equity that a federal court should exercise its judicial dis-
cretion to dismiss a suit merely because a state court could entertain it." Alabama Public
Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 361 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(quoted in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-
14 (1976)); see Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Case
Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. Cn. L. REv. 636 (1979).
77. See Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for
Prospective Relief, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 193; Zeigler, Federal Court Reform of State
Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine from a Modern
Perspective, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 31 (1985).
78. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). See generally Althouse,
How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HLv. L. REv.
1485, 1487 (1987).
79. 209 U.S. 123 (1907).
80. Id. at 149-50.
81. C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 292. See generally C. JAcoBs, THE ELEvmN AmEND-
Memr AND SOVEREIGN ImMuNrry (1972); J. ORTH, THE JUDIcLL PowER OF THE UNITED STATES
Tan ELEVENH AMENDMENT IN AmERCAN HISTORY (1987).
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Justice Black invoked the complementary concept of comity
as another theme in the Younger analysis." Preventing the federal
courts from enjoining state prosecutions eliminates a certain ef-
frontery in our dual court system. But federalism is not designed
for efficiency and harmony, and the question to consider is how
much jurisdictional rules ought to depend on the philosophy of
"I'm OK; You're (Not) OK." This aspect of comity-judicial
federalism-centers on the issue of parity. This is a matter of as-
sumption: should the tenets of federal jurisdiction be based on a
preference for a federal forum to decide issues of federal law.
This underlying debate has gone on since the drafting of article
IlI and will continue as long as we have a dual court system.
Basically, the argument concerns whether federal judges are some-
how "better" than state judges and therefore dispense a "juster"
justice.83
Although it has a wider application, another theme intersecting
at Younger abstention is the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The
abstention mechanism permits a federal court to refrain from ex-
ercising jurisdiction and to defer to ongoing state proceedings.
The mechanism applies only if the federal court possesses subject-
matter jurisdiction. The district court must decide whether it has
jurisdiction before deciding whether to abstain. This is not terribly
profound, but it can be dispositive. Under the statutory scheme,
district courts have original jurisdiction over federal questions,"
and the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review "[f]inal judg-
ments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State.""5 Since
district courts have only original jurisdiction, the inevitable logic
is that a district court has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from state
courts. This conclusion was the unremarkable holding in Rooker
82. See generally, Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60
N.C.L. REv. 59 (1981).
83. See, e.g., Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in
Criminal Cases: Federalism Along a Mobius Strip, 19 GA. L. REv. 799, 827-28 (1985)
("I decline to decide which I favor, federal judges or state judges. My problem is that
I respect both groups."); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Htv. L. REv. 1105 (1977);
Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical
Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HAsmiNGs CoNsT. L.Q. 213 (1983).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1982).
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v. Fidelity Trust Co.86 Once a state court has adjudicated an issue,
only the state appellate courts, and afterwards the Supreme Court,
may conduct a direct review of the matter.' This rule was reaf-
firmed in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman:
there the Supreme Court deemed situations in which "constitution-
al claims . . . are inextricably intertwined" with the state court
judgment should be included in the rule that a district court cannot
directly review a state court judgment." Thus, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine has some overlap with the procedures under the
Younger abstention doctrine.89
In a case involving Younger abstention, a party to a pre-
existing proceeding in a state court invokes constitutional rights to
begin a second independent proceeding in federal court, in which
the party requests a federal injunction to end the proceeding in the
state court. This sequence should be distinguished from the
mechanism of removal. In a case involving removal, a civil action
or a criminal action is commenced in a state court and the state
defendant exercises a statutory right to remove the entire case to
federal court, where it is decided by a federal judge. This removal
is possible when the state defendant is a federal official, any per-
son who is denied or cannot enforce in state court a right under
a law providing equal civil rights, or any person who is being sued
for doing an act under authority of a law providing for equal rights
or for refusing to do an act on the grounds that it would be in-
consistent with such a law.' Younger abstention and the removal
statutes are separate and distinct themes.
The last mentioned theme that intersects with the Younger
doctrine is res judicata/collateral estoppel, also known in the
modem parlance as claim preclusion/issue preclusion.9' The
86. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
87. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
296 (1970).
88. 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983).
89. See Note, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Federal
Court Power over State Court Proceedings, 54 FoRDHAM L. REv. 767, 777-83 (1986);
Note, The Ultimate Expansion of the Younger Doctrine: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
41 Sw. LJ. 1055, 1057-58 (1987).
90. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a, 1443 (1982). See, e.g., Mesa v. California, 109 S.
Ct. 959 (1989).
91. See RESTATEM Nr (SEcoND) oF JuDmMElrs §74 (1982); Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First
Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
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Supreme Court has held that the failure to appeal a state criminal
conviction does not bar prospective federal declaratory and injunc-
tive relief to prevent further prosecution under the same statute.92
The claim preclusive and issue preclusive effects of federal lower
court declaratory judgments obtained by particular plaintiffs, how-
ever, remains uncertain. Whether a lower federal court may enjoin
a pending state prosecution initiated against a previously successful
plaintiff to an action for a declaratory judgment and the extent to
which other parties may rely on the preclusive effect of such an
earlier declaratory judgment are open questions.93
Understood within the context of these various principles of
federal jurisdiction, the nonintervention rule of Younger keeps the
federal court from interfering in the state proceeding. This non-
intervention is a norm of federal jurisdiction, although at times
competing norms support federal intervention." This complexity
is just what one would expect in a doctrine that partakes of such
basic constitutional values.
D. Radiants of the Younger Abstention Doctrine
The issue decided in Younger, the case, was momentous but
narrow: the propriety of a federal court enjoining a contem-
poraneous state criminal trial. The principle of federalism in
Younger, the doctrine, radiates in different directions and in vary-
ing degrees. Here considered briefly are six directions in which
the doctrine extends:95 declaratory judgments when state proceed-
ings are pending, declaratory judgments when state proceedings are
not pending, injunctive relief when state proceedings are not pend-
ing, state administrative proceedings, injunctions against state and
local executive officers, and state civil cases when the government
is a party and between private parties.
92. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710-12 (1977).
93. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1974); id. at 477 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 482 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
94. See Collins, supra note 48.
95. This framework is from E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 631-51. See also
Note, The New Federal Comity: Pursuit of Younger Ideas in a Civil Context, 61 lowA
L. REv. 784, 794-98 (1976).
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1. Declaratory Judgments When State Proceedings are Pend-
ing.-The first issue of extension was whether the Younger doctrine
applied to a request for declaratory relief from a plaintiff who was
subject to a pending criminal prosecution in state court. The answer
came in a companion case to Younger, which held that the prin-
ciples of the main decision were fully applicable to actions for dec-
laratory judgments. Justice Black, author for the Court, concluded
in Samuels v. Mackell that "ordinarily a declaratory judgment will
result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of state
proceedings that the long-standing policy limiting injunctions was
designed to avoid." 6 The emphasis in Younger was that constitu-
tional issues should be decided in the state court within the pending
criminal prosecution. The Court held, therefore, that "in cases
where the state criminal prosecution was begun prior to the federal
suit.., where an injunction would be impermissible under these
principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well."'
Nothing should be made of the tantalizing adverb "ordinarily," for
the Court blinked at fine distinctions between injunctive and dec-
laratory relief to conclude that "the practical effect of the two.forms
of relief will be virtually identical."98 A related issue that remains
unresolved is whether a federal court may provide monetary relief
to an individual who is a criminal defendant in state court when
the federal action for damages arises from the same episode that is
the subject of the state prosecution." The Supreme Court has in-
dicated only that a stay of the federal damage action is appropriate
in that situation."°
2. Declaratory Judgments When State Proceedings are Not
Pending.-In Steffel v. Thompson, decided a few terms after
96. 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971).
97. Id. at 73. But cf. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
98. 401 U.S. at 73. But see Dorenberg & Mushlin, History Comes Calling: Dean
Griswold Offers New Evidence About the Jurisdictional Debate Surrounding the Enact-
ment of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 37 UCLA L. REv. 139 (1989); Whitten, Federal
Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme
Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REv. 591 (1975).
99. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193 (1988). The lower courts are divided
on the issue. Compare Feaster v. Miksch, 846 F.2d 21, 24 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 148 (1988) and Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986) with Bishop
v. State Bar of Tex., 736 F.2d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1984).
100. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193 (1988).
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Younger, a unanimous Supreme Court held that a federal court
could enter a declaratory judgment when there was no ongoing state
criminal prosecution.'' "When no state criminal proceeding is
pending at the time the federal complaint is filed," the Court con-
cluded that the Younger principle did not apply since "federal in-
tervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or
disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal in-
tervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting nega-
tively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional
principles.""°  This precedent establishes the proposition that a
federal court may issue a declaratory judgment if state criminal
proceedings are threatened, as in Steffel, but not actually pending.
Of course, the "case or controversy" requirement of article IH other-
wise must be satisfied, as is true in all declaratory actions.
Just what constitutes a pending state proceeding is somewhat
undetermined. Younger and Samuels, one of the companion cases,
make it evident that abstention is triggered by a state indictment
or information. The Supreme Court has deemed a grand jury in-
vestigation sufficient to justify at least a federal court stay of an
action for damages. °4 Some members of the Court have said that
"any arrest prior to resolution of the federal action would con-
stitute a pending prosecution and bar declaratory relief."'0 5
Just when a state prosecution is pending is a fluid concept.
In Hicks v. Miranda, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal court
could not enter a declaratory judgment after a state prosecution
was commenced, even though the state prosecution was filed the
day after the filing of the federal action."° The Court held that
"where the state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal
plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any
proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the
federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in
full force."'0 7  This holding gives the state prosecutor, in effect,
101. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
102. Id. at 462.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982); see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227
(1937).
104. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193 (1988).
105. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 480 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
106. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
107. Id. at 349.
[Vol. 9:303
OUR FEDERALISM
the power to remove an action for a declaratory judgment from
federal court by beginning a prosecution against the federal plain-
tiff in a state court at some preliminary stage of the federal suit: 8
Hicks reveals that the Court's comity rationale is not a principle
of mutuality, but one of unilateral deference to state courts.
State judiciaries need not defer to the federal court's interest in
deciding constitutional claims that are properly within their
jurisdiction, but federal courts must dismiss cases as soon as
state litigation is commenced."°
3. Injunctive Relief When State Proceedings are Not Pend-
ing.-Although a few Justices offered their views, the Court's
decision in Steffel did not address whether a federal court could
issue an injunction in the absence of a state court proceeding; the
holding dealt only with declaratory judgments, although the
majority observed in dictum "that a declaratory judgment will have
less intrusive effect on the administration of state criminal laws"
than would an injunction.' The next year, however, the Court
decided Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., a case within the purview of
Steffel in which no action was pending in state court. The Court
ruled that a preliminary injunction could issue, without satisfying
the exceptions to the Younger doctrine, to preserve the status quo
while the district court considered whether to grant declaratory
relief."3 The Court seemed to imply, however, that a permanent
injunction might be treated differently because "a district court can
generally protect the interests of a federal plaintiff by entering a
declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger injunctive
medicine will be unnecessary."".4
In another case within the purview of Steffel, the Court ig-
nored this implied distinction. According to the holding in Wooley
v. Maynard,"5 a permanent injunction may issue so long as there
is no proceeding pending in state court. Although there is a
108. Id. at 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see Fiss, supra note 51, at 1135-36.
109. E. CHEmBmRNsKy, supra note 10, at 637. But see Homstein & Nagle, State Court
Power to Enjoin Federal Judicial Proceedings: Donovan v. City of Dallas Revisited, 60
WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1982); supra text accompanying note 90.
110. 415 U.S. 452, 482 (1974) (Rehnquist, ., concurring).
111. Id. at 469.
112. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
113. Id. at 930.
114. Id. at 931.
115. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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general policy against federal courts enjoining enforcement of
criminal statutes, the Court concluded that an injunction was ap-
propriate under "exceptional circumstances" upon "a clear showing
that an injunction is necessary in order to afford adequate protec-
tion of constitutional rights."1 6 The facts before the Court were
exceptional in that the federal plaintiff had been prosecuted three
times in five weeks under a particular statute. In order to uphold
the injunction, the Court held the statute to be unconstitutional."'
Thus, under the Younger abstention doctrine, both preliminary and
permanent injunctions are treated the same as declaratory judg-
ments.
4. State Administrative Proceedings.-The Younger decision
has its origin in judicial federalism, the comity inherent in our
nation's system of dual courts. The Supreme Court's extension of
the Younger doctrine has not been so restricted.
The Court first applied the Younger abstention doctrine to
state administrative proceedings in Middlesex County Ethics Com-
mittee v. Garden State Bar Association."' In that case, the plain-
tiffs sued in federal court, alleging that their first amendment rights
were being violated in an ongoing administrative investigation by
a state bar ethics committee. The Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision to dismiss the suit in deference to the state
proceeding, holding that "[t]he policies underlying Younger are
fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when impor-
tant state interests are involved.""' 9 The administrative investiga-
tion was sufficiently "judicial" in that the state supreme court
supervised the bar ethics committee system and reviewed the
result. The state's interest in assuring the professional conduct of
lawyers was "extremely important."'20  Beyond this, the Court's
opinion was not terribly specific.
The Middlesex County decision could have been narrowed to
the facts: the bar disciplinary proceedings were an adjunct to the
state judicial system. Despite this aspect of Middlesex County, the
116. Id. at 712.
117. Id. at 715.
118. 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
119. Id. at 432.
120. Id. at 434.
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potential for expanding the abstention doctrine was realized a few
years later in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian
Schools, Inc.' A teacher at a church-run school filed a complaint
with the state civil rights commission alleging various violations
of her rights, including unlawful gender discrimination. The
school invoked the first amendment in a plea in bar before the
commission and also filed a suit in federal court seeking to enjoin
the state administrative hearing. The federal trial court entered a
judgment on the merits. The Supreme Court held that the district
court "should have abstained from adjudicating this case under
Younger v. Harris . . . and later cases."'" The Court re-
emphasized that the Younger abstention doctrine extended to state
administrative proceedings "in which important state interests are
vindicated, so long as in the course of those proceedings the
federal plaintiff would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate
his constitutional claim."'" The Court reasoned that eliminating
gender discrimination was an important state interest and found
that the procedures for state judicial review of the administrative
proceeding provided an adequate opportunity to raise the constitu-
tional issues.'24
The holding in Dayton Christian Schools potentially
broadened federal court deference to state administrative agencies
in a profound way."2 Last Term, however, the Supreme Court
gave no sign of applying the rule so broadly. In New Orleans
Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,'26 the Court
declined to extend the Middlesex County principle to a city
council's ratemaking process that was being challenged in federal
court under a theory of pre-emption. Instead, the Court held that
121. 477 U.S. 619 (1986); see Edwards, supra note 42 at 1028-29.
122. 477 U.S. at 625.
123. Id. at 627; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1973).
124. 477 U.S. at 629.
125. In a curious footnote, the Court distinguished Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457
U.S. 496 (1982), which held that one need not exhaust state administrative remedies
before bringing a lawsuit under § 1983. 477 U.S. at 627 n.2. If no administrative
proceeding is pending, a plaintiff may sue in federal court without exhausting state ad-
ministrative remedies; once an administrative proceeding is initiated, the federal court
should abstain, at least if the state interest is important and the procedures are adequate.
Id.
126. 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989).
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Younger abstention was not appropriate. 27 The controlling inquiry
was "the importance of the generic proceedings to the state."'' 8
Regulating intrastate retail rates of electric utilities was important.
The Court seemed to minimize at least some of the potential for
expansion in Middlesex County and Dayton Christian Schools to
say that "it has never been suggested that Younger requires absten-
tion in deference to a state judicial proceeding reviewing legisla-
tive or executive action."'29  In recasting those two earlier
opinions, the Court pointed out that those administrative proceed-
ings were not yet at an end when the federal court proceeding was
begun.30 Now we are told that the Court has "never squarely
focused" on whether the Younger rule prevents a challenge to a
final administrative proceeding in federal court.' Thus, although
it remains to be seen, this Younger radiant may no longer be as
vibrant as it once was. Future decisions also will need to clarify
the blurred distinctions between this extension of Younger and the
Burford abstention doctrine.'
5. Injunctions Against State and Local Executive Officers.-
Perhaps the most curious possible extension of the Younger absten-
tion doctrine is found in the hints in Supreme Court opinions about
a federal court's authority to consider constitutional challenges to
state and local executive actions. The first such implication was
made in O'Shea v. Littleton.' Plaintiffs brought suit in federal
court under § 1983, alleging that the municipal court officials in-
tentionally discriminated against blacks in setting bail and in sen-
tencing. The Supreme Court held that the case or controversy
requirement was not satisfied in that the dispute was not yet ripe.'
The opinion went on, however, to suggest that the principle behind
the Younger doctrine should apply: "This seems to us nothing less
than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings which
127. Id. at 2520.
128. Id. at 2516.
129. Id. at 2518.
130. Id. at 2518 n.4.
131. 109 S. Ct. 2506, 2518-19 n.4 (1989).
132. See id. at 2513-15 (discussing Burford); see also supra text accompanying notes
23-27.
133. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
134. Id. at 495-99.
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would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger
v. Harris . . . and related cases sought to prevent."'35 This con-
clusion was not a direct application of Younger, since there was no
pending state proceeding-a certain doctrinal condition-and since
the challenge raised was to the very adequacy of the state court
system to decide these matters-a clear exception to the doctrine.
The Court best may be understood to have invoked an analogy,
expressing the "concern that constant federal court monitoring of
state courts would inevitably entail federal judicial interference with
ongoing state proceedings of a sort clearly prohibited in Younger.' 136
That the Court had in mind application of, rather than mere
analogy to, Younger abstention to state and local executive actions
is suggested, however, by the decision in Rizzo v. Goode. 37 Find-
ing substantial evidence of racial discrimination in patterns of
police brutality and concluding that department disciplinary proce-
dures were inadequate, the district court issued an injunction to
reform the police procedures. The Supreme Court refused federal
relief because the case or controversy requirement was not satis-
fied; the alleged injury was not "real and immediate.' 38 What a
small, unnamed minority of police officers might do to plaintiffs
in the future based on their subjective evaluation of the deterrence
of existing procedures was described by the Court as too specula-
tive and conjectural. Repeating the invocation of the Younger
doctrine in O'Shea, the Court sounded an "Our Federalism" call
for judicial restraint even in matters of state and local executive
action:
Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important
part in governing the relationship between federal courts and
state governments, though initially expounded and perhaps en-
titled to their greatest weight in cases where it was sought to
enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have not been limited
to that situation or indeed to a criminal proceeding itself. We
think these principles likewise have applicability where injunc-
tive relief is sought, not against the judicial branch of the state
government, but against those in charge of an executive branch
135. Id. at 500.
136. E. CHEME RsKY, supra note 10, at 649.
137. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
138. Id. at 371-73.
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of an agency of state or local governments such as petitioners
here.1
The Court elaborated on this theme again in City of Los An-
geles v. Lyons." ° Again, the Court held that the article III require-
ment of a case or controversy was not satisfied."" The plaintiff
did not establish a sufficiently real and immediate threat that
without justification or provocation he would be subjected again
to the challenged police chokehold procedure. In an alternative
holding that assumed standing, the Court ruled that notions of
equitable restraint would bar any federal injunctive relief against
the police department, and directed the lower courts to practice
"restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers
engaged in the administration of the States' criminal laws in the
absence of irreparable injury which is both great and immediate,"
and cited Younger v. Harris.'42 The Supreme Court explicitly in-
voked "normal principles of equity, comity, and federalism that
should inform the judgment of federal courts when asked to over-
see state law enforcement authorities."'43  This extension of
Younger abstention does not appear to be waning."
6. State Civil Cases When the Government is a Party and
Between Private Parties.-As the Younger abstention doctrine was
extended to apply to state civil proceedings, the tentative effort in
the lower federal courts was to describe a threshold below which
there would be no abstention. Extrapolating from the doctrine's
criteria, the lower courts focused on whether the state proceedings
were ongoing, of an inherently judicial nature, and sufficiently im-
portant to deserve deference under Younger.'45 The lower courts
were expressly reluctant to extend Younger abstention beyond the
Supreme Court holdings. 6 The high Court's parallel precedent has
139. Id. at 380.
140. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
141. Id. at 105.
142. Id. at 112.
143. Id.
144. See Edwards, supra note 42, at 1027-28; Rosenfeld, The Place of State Courts
in the Era of Younger v. Harris, 59 B.U.L. REv. 597, 624 (1979).
145. See Note, Civil Rights Suits that Interfere with Ongoing State Civil Proceedings:
Younger Abstention in the Wake of Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 24 Hous. L. Ray. 917,
930-45 (1987).
146. Id. at 939.
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had a momentum of its own, however, toward extending the
doctrine. This momentum culminated in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc. That higher precedent is chronicled in the next part of this
Article.
Ill. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.
A. The Momentum of Precedent
The decision in Younger arose in the particular context of a
state criminal proceeding. In a series of holdings, however, the
Supreme Court extended the doctrine, first to civil proceedings in
which the state was a party and then to civil suits between private
parties. Hence, the characterization of the proceeding does not
control. The controlling question is a broader one: whether the
exercise of the equity power of the federal court will do violence
to "Our Federalism." In other words, the question is whether a
federal injunction will "unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the states."'47
The first Supreme Court decision to apply Younger abstention
in a civil context was Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd."8 Under a state
statute declaring the exhibition of obscene films to be a nuisance,
state officials sued a theater in state court and obtained a state
court judgment closing the theater for one year. Forgoing the state
appeal, the theater owner sued in federal court under § 1983 seek-
ing declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge district court
enjoined the state court's judgment under the first and fourteenth
amendments to the extent that it applied to films that had not yet
been adjudged obscene; but on direct review, the Supreme Court
reversed and held that the district court should have abstained. 49
Concluding that Younger obliged abstention, the Court reasoned
that the state nuisance proceeding was "more akin to a criminal
prosecution than are most civil cases."'50 The majority emphasized
that the state was a party in the civil nuisance proceeding "in aid
of and closely related to" criminal obscenity statutes and, there-
147. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). See generally E. CHeamsKY, supra
note 10, at 640-45.
148. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See generally Shaman & Turkington, Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd.: The Federal Courthouse Door Closes Further, 56 B.U.L. REv. 907 (1976).
149. 420 U.S. at 611-12.
150. Id. at 604.
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fore, "an offense to the state's interest in the nuisance litigation
is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal
proceeding."'' There was no showing made on any of the
Younger exceptions. The majority expressly stated that this hold-
ing was not a "general [pronouncement] upon the applicability of
Younger to all civil litigation.'
5 2
The dissent in Huffian described the holding as "obviously only
the first step" toward extending the Younger abstention doctrine to
state civil proceedings generally.'53 The second foot fell in Trainor
v. Hernandez," a case in which the state welfare department brought
a civil fraud proceeding in state court to recover welfare benefits from
a recipient who allegedly concealed personal assets. Under a state
statute, the department obtained a writ of attachment against the
recipient's savings account. The recipient sued in federal court to
challenge the constitutionality of the state attachment statute and
sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The Supreme Court held that
Younger abstention did apply, again emphasizing that, as a party to
the suit, the state was performing a sovereign function: "Both the
suit and the accompanying writ of attachment were brought to vindi-
cate important state policies such as safeguarding the integrity of those
programs. The state authorities also had the option of vindicating
these policies through criminal prosecutions."'5 5 Again, the Court ex-
pressly declined to decide whether to extend Younger v. Harris to all
civil suits."
The next important precedent for applying Younger abstention
to civil proceedings in state court brought by the state government
was Moore v. Sims.'57 The state agency had removed children
from their home under the authority of an emergency ex parte
order of a state court giving the agency temporary custody. The
parents successfully sued in federal court on a procedural due
process challenge to the state procedures. The Supreme Court
held that the district court should not have exercised jurisdiction
but should have abstained under the Younger doctrine.' Again,
151. Id.
152. Id. at 607.
153. 420 U.S. 592, 613 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
155. Id. at 444.
156. Id. at 444-45 n.8. But see id. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
158. Id. at 423.
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the state was a party and the civil proceeding was in aid of and
closely related to criminal statutes. The majority seemed intent
on broadening the rationale to make Younger abstention "fully ap-
plicable to civil proceedings in which important state interests are
involved.' 59 Yet again, the majority formally eschewed decision
of that issue."W It began to appear that the term "important"
applied whenever a state agency had statutory authorization to sue
in state court. Such authorizations were the proper object of
federal court deference "unless state law clearly bars the interposi-
tion of the constitutional claim."' 61
During the same Term Trainor v. Hernandez was decided, the
Supreme Court for the first time applied the Younger abstention
doctrine to a state civil proceeding in which the state was not a
party litigant in Juidice v. Vail.62 Individual debtors were held in
contempt in state court in supplemental proceedings brought by
their judgment creditor. The contemnors filed suit in federal court
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the state contempt
proceeding. Although the actual parties in the state court, the
creditors and debtors, were private litigants, the Supreme Court
placed emphasis on the state's interest in state court contempt
proceedings. The Court explained that the "State's interest in the
contempt process, through which it vindicates the regular operation
of its judicial system ... is of sufficiently great import to require
application of the principles of [the Younger line of] cases."'63 The
majority located the state court contempt power "at the core of
the administration of a State's judicial system,"' 64 and admitted that
the decision went further along the continuum from Younger!
criminal prosecutions to Huffinan/quasi-criminal nuisance
proceedings to Juidice/contempt proceedings. But labels-
criminal, quasi-criminal, civil-did not control. What mattered
were the federal interference with state interest and the affront to
the state judiciary that were to be avoided by abstention. Once
159. Id.
160. Id. at 423 n.8. But see id. at 435-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 425-26. But see id. at 436-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
163. Id. at 335.
164. Id.
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again, the Court issued the standard disclaimer that the holding
did not necessarily extend Younger to all state civil proceedings." 5
On the eve of the decision in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
the question remained open, at least technically, whether Younger
abstention had application to state civil suits between private par-
ties in which the state government was not a litigant.'" In that
decision, the Supreme Court once again asymptotically approached
the issue.67
B. The Decision"
The facts in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.' are almost certainly
familiar to anyone reading this Article. 7 The dispute began with
negotiations towards a merger and acquisition by Pennzoil of Getty
Oil.' Texaco eventually purchased Getty Oil for a higher price
than Pennzoil had agreed to pay, and Pennzoil sued Texaco in state
court for tortious interference with contract.' The state court jury
returned a Brobdingnagian verdict for Pennzoil: $7.53 billion in
actual damages and $3 billion in punitive damages. Once the state
court entered judgment, Pennzoil could execute the judgment
under state law unless Texaco filed an $11 billion supersedeas
bond.73 Since that bond amount was beyond the realm of finan-
165. Id. at 336 n.13. But see id. at 345 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. Compare Lamb Enters., Inc. v. Kiroff, 549 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 968 (1977) with New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 849 (1971).
167. "ITihe Court resolved this uncertainty and applied Younger to private civil mat-
ters." E. CwwRmmsKy, supra note 10, at 644.
168. This discussion relies on Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in
Abstention Cases: Observations on the Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L.
Rnv. 1051 (1988). See also Comment, Federal Courts-The Younger Abstention Doctrine
Applied to State Civil Judgment Enforcement Procedures, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. Rnv. 228
(1988).
169. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
170. See generally 481 U.S. at 3-6.
171. See Note, The $10.53 Billion Question-When Are the Parties Bound?: Pennzoil
and the Use of Agreements in Principle in Mergers and Acquisitions, 40 VAND. L. Rv.
1367 (1987).
172. Both Pennzoil and Texaco had incorporated in Delaware, so there was no diver-
sity jurisdiction to allow removal to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (1982);
supra text accompanying note 90.
173. See generally Carlson, Mandatory Supersedeas Bond Requirements-A Denial of
Due Process Rights?, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 29 (1987).
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cial possibility, Texaco filed suit in a federal district court chal-
lenging the bond requirement under due process and equal
protection. In turn, Pennzoil urged Younger abstention. The dis-
trict court granted a preliminary injunction against Pennzoil to
prevent execution of the state court judgment." The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.175 The Supreme Court
reversed, with all nine justices agreeing in the judgment."" Four
justices joined a "Powellian" opinion, concluding that "[t]he courts
below should have abstained under the principles of federalism
enunciated in Younger v. Harris."'"
The majority invoked three principles underlying abstention.
First, the notion that equity should not interfere when a remedy
at law is adequate, especially in a criminal law case, was repeated
again in familiar litany and with familiar irrelevancy to the case
sub judice, a civil suit between two private litigants." The
Court's analysis next invoked the hackneyed quotation of "Our
Federalism." Recognizing the momentum of Supreme Court
precedent, the Court found Younger abstention to apply not only
to state criminal prosecutions but also to pending proceedings "if
the State's interests in the proceeding are so important that exer-
cise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity
174. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
175. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1157 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481
U.S. 1 (1987). See generally Lushing, Texaco v Pennzoil: The Use and Creation of
Precedent by the Second Circuit, 11 T. MAR. L. REv. 289 (1986); Note, Expanding the
Due Process Rights of Indigent Litigants: Will Texaco Trickle Down?, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 463 (1986); Note, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a Crude Analysis of the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine's Preclusion of Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 627
(1987).
176. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
177. 481 U.S. at 10. Justice Powell authored the majority opinion and was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Id. at 3. Justice
Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice O'Connor joined, asserting that there
was no Rooker-Feldman issue. Id. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun would
have had the district court abstain under the Pullman doctrine rather than the Younger
doctrine. Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
thought that abstention was inappropriate, but each would have ruled against Texaco on
the constitutional merits. Id. at 18 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 23
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 29 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
In this line of cases, close divisions of the Justices are the norm and concurring and
dissenting opinions are common. For the box scores, see Note, supra note 89, at 1069-71
178. Id. at 17.
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between the States and the National Government."'79  The third
principle underlying Younger is the more direct concern in
Pullman abstention: "avoid[ing] unwarranted determination of
federal constitutional questions."'80 When a federal court reaches
the constitutional issue based on an assumed interpretation of a
state law, the constitutional holding is vulnerable to being rendered
"meaningless"-akin to a post hoc advisory opinion-by some
subsequent state court redetermination of the state law issue. 8'
This fact of judicial federalism is more obvious in diversity juris-
diction and Pullman abstention, but has been noted in earlier
Younger discussions.' This principle has new significance after
Pennzoil, especially in cases like Pennzoil in which the state con-
stitution has a provision parallel to the federal clause that is subject
to definitive state court interpretation.8 3
The Court once again emphasized the second principle, the in-
determinate inquiry into the importance of the state interest that
the Court had followed to extend "Our Federalism" to pending
state civil proceedings from Younger to Huffnan to Trainor to
Moore to Juidice."' The Court reasoned that Juidice was control-
ling.'85 The decision to abstain in Pennzoil, like the decision in
Juidice, "rest[ed] on the importance to the States of enforcing the
orders and judgments of their courts." 86 This reasoning broadened
the Younger abstention doctrine. Contempt is integral to the
State's court system and the state was indirectly a party in the per-
son of Juidice, the state judge whose contempt order required that
179. Id. at 11; see supra Subpart I1(A).
180. 481 U.S. at 11; cf. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). For a discussion of Pullman, see supra text accom-
panying notes 11-22. The majority expressly declined to apply Pullman because Pennzoil
had not raised the issue. 481 U.S. at 11 n.9. Justice Blackmun concurred on the basis
of Pullman abstention, however. Id. at 29 (Blackmun, ., concurring in judgment).
181. 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
182. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 428 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434, 445 (1977).
183. Compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) with Reetz v.
Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970). See Althouse, supra note 78; Baker, supra note 83, at
820-22.
184. See supra Subpart DI(A).
185. 481 U.S. at 13.
186. 481 U.S. 1, 13 (1987).
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Vail be arrested, jailed, and fined.' 7 In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., the Court was unwilling to draw a line between the contempt
power and the State's interest in ensuring that Pennzoil, a private
litigant, could collect on the judgment against Texaco: "Both
Juidice and this case involve challenges to the processes by which
the State compels compliance with the judgments of its courts.'''
The Court insisted that this state interest went beyond the State's
undifferentiated interest in the civil jurisdiction of its court system.
Almost as if to mock commentators as much as to answer dis-
agreeing Justices, the Court dropped the almost obligatory footnote
that its "opinion does not hold that Younger abstention is always
appropriate whenever a civil proceeding is pending in a state
court.'
190
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that an exception to
Younger should apply because Texaco had not satisfied its burden
of showing that the state courts did not offer an adequate forum
to hear and decide the federal constitutional issues.' 91 Texaco had
not in fact presented the constitutional claims, or any claims for
that matter, to any state appellate court. Therefore, the Court as-
sumed an adequacy in state procedures, absent unambiguous and
controlling state law authority to the contrary. This strict a stan-
dard may amount to the functional equivalent of a requirement that
state appellate court remedies be exhausted. 92
C. The Importance of This Precedent
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. is a serious precedent93 of
uncertain dimension. 94 A narrow reading is possible and also is
consistent with the language and logic of the opinion; namely,
Pennzoil is simply an application of Juidice and does not extend
187. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1977).
188. But see Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481
U.s. I (1987).
189. 481 U.S. at 13-14.
190. Id. at 14 n.12. But see id. at 30 n.2 (Stevens, L, concurring in judgment).
191. 481 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1987).
192. See Althouse, supra note 168, at 1063-65. But see Walker v. City of Birming-
ham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
193. See Althouse, supra note 168, at 1075.
194. See E. CHaamNsKY, supra note 10, at 644; M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISbicIoN: Te;
SIONS iN ThE ALLOCATION OF JuDICIAL PowER 367 (2d ed. 1990).
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Younger abstention beyond the important state interest of enforce-
ment of court orders: "Not only would federal injunctions in such
cases interfere with the execution of state judgments, but they
would do so on grounds that challenge the very process by which
those judgments are obtained."' 95 On the other hand, a broad read-
ing is possible and consistent with the language and logic of the
opinion: Pennzoil finally extends Younger abstention to all state
civil proceedings, footnote disclaimers notwithstanding: "So long
as those challenged statutes relate to pending state proceedings,
proper respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal ques-
tions presented in state court litigation mandates that the federal
court stay its hand."'96 These two sentences are back-to-back in
the opinion. Thus, the "correct" interpretation depends on which
sentence is emphasized, and the final answer depends on the em-
phasis of a majority of the Court some time in the future.
One who takes the narrow view and interprets Pennzoil as an
incremental precedent might anticipate the next increment. Per-
haps the Court will combine Younger abstention in private suits
with challenges to prejudgment attachments."9 In this way, the
abstention doctrine might begin to have the effect of removing
from federal court procedural due process challenges to state pro-
cedures. 9 Thus, the precedent may just be the latest in a line of
"Our Federalism" decisions.
One who takes a broader view and interprets Pennzoil as a
more profound decision of "Our Federalism" might consider the
future of the abstention doctrine. First, there is that intriguing-at
least to professors of federal jurisdiction-footnote nine.'" The
majority explained that Pullman abstention was not raised in the
Supreme Court and would not be considered, and then offered this
dictum:
We merely note that considerations similar to those that man-
date Pullman abstention are relevant to a court's decision
whether to abstain under Younger. The various types of absten-
195. 481 U.S. at 14.
196. 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987).
197. Compare Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444-47 (1977) (abstention) with
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 71 n.3 (1972) (no abstention).
198. See Lebbos v. Judges, 883 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1989); Comment, supra note 168,
at 233-34.
199. 481 U.S. at I1 n.9.
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tion are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must
try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a complex of considerations
designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that con-
templates parallel judicial processes."
This dictum could be understood to reinforce a broad interpretation
that Younger abstention applies whenever a federal plaintiff is.
seeking to enjoin state court proceedings. Indeed, one of the
attorneys for Pennzoil has concluded that "[a]s a result of the
Pennzoil decision, the Younger abstention doctrine no longer ap-
plies only where there is a pending case . . . . Instead, it applies
to any case where pending state judicial proceedings are structural-
ly capable of resolving the problem." '' The message in the foot-
note might presage a kind of grand unified theory of abstention
on the level of generality of the "Our Federalism" slogan. In other
words, categories of abstention would be merged, distinctions
between the categories would be blurred, and abstention would
become a conclusory label. Like too many other issues in con-
stitutional law, it would amount to ad hoc balancing in which the
weighing of the interests is done "off the books" by some judicial
sleight of hand. This balancing could result in fewer abstentions
or more abstentions, depending on the judges' attitudes towards
federalism. The various categories of abstention might merge into
an omnibus abstention doctrine. On the other hand, the Court was
careful in this dictum to differentiate between the two categories
of abstention, in effect re-emphasizing their separateness. Given
the overall momentum of the precedent radiants and their com-
bined force, reinforced by the judicial attitudes they portray, this
footnote, at least, holds the potential for much greater deference
to state courts.2°2
There are any number of other intriguing thematic questions
about the Pennzoil holding: How much of the enthusiasm for this
200. Id.
201. Tribe, Constitutional Law Conference, 56 U.S.L.W. 2333 (1987); see also
Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 58
FoRDHw L. REv. 997, 1029-33 (1989).
202. See Edwards, supra note 42, at 1035-36; Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court
System and Some Prescriptions for Relief, 51 ALB. L. Rnv. 151, 164 (1987); cf. New
Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989); Than
Vong Hoai v. Sun Ref. and Mktg. Co., 866 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also Fried-
man, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 530, 546-50 (1989).
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neo-abstention version of "Our Federalism" is properly attributable
to a concern of self-restraint to preserve scarce federal judicial
resources? 3 Will the decision be understood as a precedent for
exhaustion of state court remedies under § 1983?"°4 Does it have
the effect of overruling Mitchum v. Foster, which held that § 1983
is an exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, § 2283? °0 Does the
Younger deference now owed to state courts oblige deference any
time the state courts are open to hear the constitutional issue?"°6
What does Pennzoil contribute to the debate over parity?..7 Is the
presumption of adequacy in the state forum ever rebuttable, in
theory and as a practical matter?0 8 Should Congress, if it can,
legislate in this area and, if so, would it help?2" Is the preclusive
effect of not taking an appeal in the state court system complete
and absolute?210
The Court's analysis in Pennzoil thus raises more questions
than it answers, as is fitting of a self-described "complex of con-
siderations." '' Within the complex of Younger abstention and,
more particularly, within the radiant of precedent extending the
doctrine to civil cases, the Court has provided some answers, ten-
tative though they be.2"2
203. See Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipula-
tion of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 321, 338 (1989). Justice Powell, the author
of the Pennzoil opinion, once worried:
No trend of decisions by this Court has been stronger-for two decades or
more-than that toward expanding federal jurisdiction at the expense of state in-
terests and state court jurisdiction. Of course, Congress also has moved steadily
and expansively to exercise its preemptive power to displace state and local
authority. Often decisions of this Court and congressional enactments have been
necessary in the national interest. The effect, nevertheless, has been the erosion
of federalism-a basic principle of the Constitution and our federal union.
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677-78 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
204. See supra note 125.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
206. See supra text accompanying note 201.
207. See supra text accompanying note 83.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 47-60.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74; supra note 10.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
211. 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987).
212. See Althouse, supra note 168, at 1075; Note, The Preemption Dimension of
Abstention, 89 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 310 (1989).
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The line of expansion resulting in the application of Younger
abstention to civil proceedings has been traced above.213 The
Younger abstention doctrine had its origin in a federalism concern
for state criminal prosecutions. This concern became more at-
tenuated in Huffinan, Trainor, Moore, and Juidice. The expansion
of the doctrine in other directions served to accentuate this trend.214
Therefore, the decisional analysis in Pennzoil is best understood
as an extension of precedent rather than an abrupt departure. As
the Younger analysis has expanded to recognize more state inter-
ests, the Court apparently has found it easier and easier to con-
clude that these state interests were sufficiently important to
command deference.
If we pick up the abstention story with Juidice v. Vail215 -the
decision the Pennzoil majority deemed controlling -- we can ap-
preciate the state of the art of the Court's state interest analysis.
In Juidice, the Court recognized that previous applications of
Younger abstention in civil cases had closely resembled criminal
prosecutions and that the state was a party litigant.217 Technically,
Juidice involved a private suit on a defaulted personal loan. The
creditor had sued in state court and won a default judgment. The
debtor, Vail, failed to pay the judgment, and the creditor's attor-
ney, under the state procedures, served him with a subpoena to
appear and to give some explanation for the refusal to pay. When
the debtor failed to appear, a state judge, Juidice, ordered him to
appear to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
When he again failed to respond, the debtor was held in contempt
and arrested and was released after he had paid a fine. The debtor
then became a named plaintiff in a federal class action challenging
the constitutionality of the state collection procedures.
In Juidice, the federal injunction would have run against the
state judge named in the federal complaint. In Pennzoil, the
federal injunction would have run against Pennzoil barring it from
213. See supra Subpart mI(A); see also Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Ap-
plication to Noncriminal Proceedings of Rule Against Federal Judicial Intervention in
Pending or Threatened State Proceedings, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1416 (1984).
214. See supra Subpart 1I(D).
215. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
216. 481 U.S. 1, 13 (1987).
217. 430 U.S. at 333-34.
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seeking to enforce the state court judgment. Once upon a time,
this would have been a distinction worthy of federalism note: the
federal plaintiff in Juidice, unlike the federal plaintiff in Pennzoil,
was asking the federal court to intervene in the state court proce-
dure for contempt, a power the Court there described as "at the
core" of the power of the state judiciary. 18 In Pennzoil, the state's
interest was less direct and more derivative. 19 Understood this
way, the state's interest, which the state itself had described as
sufficiently neutral that it would acquiesce in federal court inter-
vention, was "essentially nothing more than the interest of state
courts in remaining free from federal judicial intrusion."2"' This
conclusion would equate the state's interest in protecting the state
court judgment for a judgment creditor in Pennzoil with the
general state interest in providing a neutral trial forum in any civil
suit."' Read this way, Pennzoil was a "perfunctory state interest
analysis" and "a rather dramatic new extension of Younger. . . to
a case with no state official as defendant."2"
But reconsider Pennzoil. Pennzoil's use of state procedure to
enforce its judgment was the state action that gave the federal
court jurisdiction under the § 1983 "color of law" requirement.'
When a private party invokes the active participation of state of-
ficials to seize property, the state action requirement of the four-
teenth amendment is satisfied. ' 4 The Supreme Court must have
acquiesced in the Second Circuit's conclusions of law to have had
subject matter jurisdiction to decide the abstention issue." There-
fore, the closer analysis is that the Supreme Court did not order
abstention in a case purely or exclusively between two private par-
ties. In Pennzoil, the judgment creditor had in effect risen to the
218. See Althouse, supra note 168, at 1080 (quoting Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335).
219. 481 U.S. at 19 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); see Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1136 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987); see also
supra note 59 and accompanying text.
220. Althouse, supra note 168, at 1053.
221. Id. at 1082. The state's interest may have been exaggerated by the open courts
provision in the state constitution. See 481 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1987).
222. Althouse, supra note 168, at 1082.
223. See Note, supra note 212, at 324-25 (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784
F.2d 1133, 1136 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987)).
224. 481 U.S. at 30 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
225. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd,
481 U.S. 1 (1987).
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level of a state actor. 6 This holding vindicated a state's interest
at least closer to the core of the state court system than appears
on first reading, perhaps as well on successive reading by some.
Thus understood, the interest in providing for dispute resolution is
not alone a sufficiently important state interest to warrant Younger
abstention.'2 This reading is supported by the repetition in Pennz-
oil of the by now obligatory footnote that the holding does not
reach the question whether Younger abstention is appropriate
whenever a civil proceeding is pending in a state court.' There-
fore, the Pennzoil holding does not necessarily oblige automatic
abstention whenever a state suit is pending. After the state court
trial is complete, however, the state court's interest in enforcing
the decision is important and justifies federal abstention. This
consideration is akin to an exhaustion requirement, which is some-
what analogous to the Colorado River criterion for determining
which proceeding is primary by comparing the progress of the
federal action with that of the state action."2  The majority in
Pennzoil seemed to invoke this type of analysis in its careful state-
ment that "we have addressed the situation that existed . . . when
this case was filed in the United States District Court. ' 210
Finally, we might speculate, along with a thoughtful commen-
tator, that the Supreme Court has played out the analysis of state
interests in the Younger abstention doctrine and that the Court
ought to rethink "Our Federalism" to pursue an analysis of federal
interests."' This suggestion of returning to first principles would
highlight the federal interest in Younger abstention: "an ideal of
abstention in deference to pending state court proceedings when
to do so will result in speedy attention to federal defenses, in-
creased familiarity with federal law and expertise in handling it,
and greater responsiveness by state courts in vindicating federal
226. See Note, supra note 212, at 324-25.
227. See First Ala. Bank v. Parsons Steel, Inc., 825 F.2d 1475, 1483 (1lth Cir. 1987);
Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Barry, 825 F.2d 1220, 1225 (8th Cir. 1987).
228. 481 U.S. 1, 14 n.12 (1987).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34; supra note 125.
230. 481 U.S. at 17-18.
231. Althouse, supra note 168, at 1083-90. "Given the supremacy of federal law and
the role of the federal courts in protecting federal rights, the state interest model has long
been a puzzling inversion of the intended order .... " Id. at 1090.
190]
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
rights.""2  Viewed from this federal perspective, the holding in
Pennzoil does not appear so far removed from the original holding
in Younger. 1 3 The concept of "Our Federalism" contemplates the
supremacy of federal law, the role of federal courts, and the preser-
vation of the constitutional order through the effective and efficient
functioning of the dual system. Should the Court pursue this in-
triguing line of analysis, it may be the most significant impact of
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. 4 Considered from this perspective
of the federal interest thus described, the case arguably presented
a more appropriate occasion for abstention than did the original
decision in Younger v. Harris.
Just what this might portend for federal jurisdiction is highly
uncertain. Abstention is supposed to be "an extraordinary and nar-
row exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a con-
troversy properly before it."" Abdication of the obligation to
decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the ex-
ceptional circumstances where the federal court's order to the par-
ties to return to the state court would clearly serve an important
countervailing interest. Federal interest analysis may allow the ex-
ception to swallow the rule.
D. Interpretation by the Supreme Court
As we have seen, various commentators predicted that the
holding in Pennzoil would increase the applications of Younger
abstention most dramatically. Besides a few brief mentions,"6 the
precedent has figured prominently in only one later Supreme Court
decision (as of the time this Article was written), New Orleans
Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, which was dis-
cussed above. 7 The regulated public utility's effort to distinguish
Younger abstention by raising an issue of pre-emption was
232. Id. at 1086-87; cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).
233. But cf. 481 U.S. 1, 30 n.1 (Stevens, L, concurring in the judgment).
234. See Althouse, supra note 168, at 1090.
235. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1976); see supra text accompanying notes 28-34. But see D. BvAiAN, PRomcnNo CON.
smFtnoNAL FREEDoMs 98 (1989).
236. See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988); Houston v. Hill,
107 S. Ct. 2502 (1987).
237. 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989); see supra text accompanying notes 126-32.
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rebuffed." If the state courts were to be presumed capable of
deciding a constitutional issue involving civil rights, there was no
reason to suppose them incapable of deciding a question of pre-
emption. Instead, the Court held that the Younger abstention
doctrine did not apply in this ratemaking procedure, which under
the Court's precedents was not "judicial in nature. ' 2 9 Such a
legislative function did not come within the restrictions of "Our
Federalism." The majority's explanation of how to identify a state
interest for purposes of Younger abstention was most relevant to
this Article: "We do not look narrowly to its interest in the out-
come of the particular case-which could arguably be offset by a
substantial federal interest in the opposite outcome; rather, what
we look to is the importance of the generic proceedings to the
state." Whether this is an inadvertent rejection of the federal
interest analysis cannot be determined, since that theory apparently
has not yet made the transition from law reviews to briefs.
E. Interpretation by the Lower Courts
A "Goldilocks" reading of the Pennzoil opinion-not too nar-
row, not too broad, but just right-has escaped the lower federal
courts so far. This quick sampling of decisions in the courts of
appeal is rather inconclusive. What Pennzoil ultimately will add
to or take away from the Younger abstention doctrine still remains
to be seen." Here are a few preliminary applications of Pennzoil
Co. v. Texaco, Inc. worth a brief note.
The lower federal courts continue to apply the three-prong test
announced in Middlesex County when deciding whether or not to
abstain from a case based upon Younger. 2 Younger abstention is
required if: (1) there are pending state judicial proceedings; (2)
the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3)
238. 109 S. Ct. at 2516.
239. Id. at 2519.
240. Id. at 2516.
241. See 2 J. MooRE, Mooans FEDERAL PRACncICE 0.203[2]; C. WRIGHT, A. MIER & E.
CooPm, supra note 9, § 4254 (1988), at 248.
242. See Lebbos v. Judges of Superior Court, 883 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1989); Partington
v. Gedan, 880 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1989); Pincham v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 872
F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1989); Hoai v. Sun Ref. and Mktg. Co., Inc., 866 F.2d 1515 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1987).
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the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise
federal questions.243
In Polykoff v. Collins,2' owners of several adult book and
video stores filed an action in federal district court seeking injunc-
tive relief and a judgment declaring unconstitutional a state statute
proscribing the sale of obscene items. The district court denied
the motion for a temporary restraining order, but set a hearing for
a preliminary injunction. Before the scheduled federal hearing, the
state district attorney filed a second declaratory judgment action
in a state court seeking to have the same statute declared constitu-
tional by the state court. The district attorney for the state then
filed a motion to dismiss in the federal district court, arguing that
the federal court should abstain because of the proceeding pending
in state court and because the owners lacked standing. The federal
district court rejected these arguments but ultimately denied the
owners' requests for federal injunctive and declaratory relief and
the owners appealed.
The Ninth Circuit held that Younger abstention would have
been inappropriate because the state's interest was not important
enough to satisfy the second prong of the Middlesex County test. 4
The court of appeals reasoned that since the declaratory judgment
action in state court did not involve state enforcement of its
statutes or "compliance with the judgments of its courts," the
state's interest did not meet the Pennzoil test of being "so impor-
tant that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the
comity between the States and the National Government."246 The
court of appeals seems to have distinguished the case from Pennz-
oil in that Pennzoil involved an action to prevent enforcement of
a state statute which was specifically designed to give effect to
the state court's judgment. Since the Ninth Circuit left alone the
district court's determination that the owners had standing, there
must have been at least a threatened enforcement of the state
obscenity statute. The determinative difference, therefore, appears
243. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982); see supra text accompanying notes 118-32.
244. 816 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Nilsson v. Ruppert, Bronson & Chicarel-
li, 888 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1989).
245. 816 F.2d at 1332.
246. Id. at 1332-33.
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to be that the federal court's construction of the statute would have
no effect upon the state court's judgment. Responding to the state
district attorney's argument that abstention was appropriate to
allow the state court to give the statute a narrowing construction,
the court of appeals noted that the state supreme court already
had definitively construed the statute.247 Such "[a]n 'abstract
possibility' " that the state court might render adjudication of the
federal question unnecessary did not require Pullman abstention.24
In Pennzoil, the Supreme Court had noted that the considerations
for avoiding unwarranted determinations of constitutional issues
expressed in Pullman were also relevant in determining the
propriety of Younger abstention; 9 however, since Pullman absten-
tion was unwarranted because the state obscenity statute was un-
ambiguous, the Ninth Circuit's holding reveals no inconsistency
with Pennzoil. Moreover, the decision of the court of appeals may
have anticipated the federal interest analysis described above and
concluded that a prompt decision of the federal question was ap-
propriate.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also applied
the three-prong test of Middlesex County in Hoai v. Sun Refining
and Marketing Co.' The case involved a contract dispute. The
plaintiff, A, filed suit in the D.C. Superior Court against B and C.
Subsequently, A and C entered into a consent agreement which
was ratified by the superior court. B was not a party to the con-
sent hearing in superior court. Thereafter, B filed a federal ques-
tion action in federal court against A. B's suit did not attack the
earlier Superior Court decree in any way. It was a separate action
altogether. A moved to dismiss on abstention grounds. The court
of appeals held abstention was not appropriate: "The Superior
Court simply ratified a voluntary agreement between [A] and [C].
The consent order did not represent an exercise of the Superior
Court's independent judgment and [B] has not attacked that judg-
ment." Thus, the court of appeals found no legitimate basis for
applying the Younger-Pennzoil principles of abstention. That the
247. Id. at 1334.
248. Id.
249. 481 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1987).
250. 866 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
251. Id. at 1519.
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judgment of the Superior Court was not being attacked seems to
have controlled, more so than that the ratification did not require
any independent judicial consideration. If the federal court action
had been used to set aside some state court enforcement of the
breached consent agreement that previously had been ratified by
the state court, the abstention holding would have been different.
The Pennzoil emphasis on comity and federalism was em-
phasized in Partington v. Gedan." 2 The federal plaintiff was an
attorney who had been charged with ineffective assistance of coun-
sel under state supreme court rules. After state proceedings were
instituted against him, plaintiff filed suit in federal district court
under § 1983. The district court concluded that abstention was
appropriate because the plaintiff could have raised his constitution-
al challenges in the ongoing state court proceeding, and the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 3
All three parts of the Middlesex County test were satisfied. 4
The court of appeals quickly declared that the nature of the
proceedings constituted an important state interest and that the
state proceedings were ongoing. Then the court gave attention to
the last prong, which deals with the plaintiff's ability to present
the federal constitutional claims in state court. Taking its cue
from Pennzoil, the court of appeals observed that "Federal Courts
'cannot assume that state judges will interpret ambiguities in state
procedural law to bar presentation of federal claims.' ", Quoting
further from Pennzoil, the court of appeals held that since the
plaintiff had not yet attempted to present his federal claims in the
related state proceedings, the federal court would "assume that
state proceedings will afford an adequate remedy." 6 As was true
of Texaco, the plaintiff simply failed to carry the burden of proof
to overcome this presumption, and his argument against abstention
likewise failed.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Younger abstention require-
ments were satisfied in Lebbos v. Judges of Superior Court. 7 A
252. 880 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Pinchan v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd.,
872 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1989).
253. 880 F.2d at 117.
254. Id. at 122.
255. Id. at 123.
256. Id.
257. 883 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1989).
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judgment was filed against an attorney. Under the authority of a
state statute, a judge appointed a receiver who under another state
statute sought to collect on the judgment by invading the attorney's
business affairs and by seizing real property owned in trust by her
daughter. The attorney filed suit in federal district court seeking
an injunction to prevent any further collection efforts by the
receiver and to have the statutes declared unconstitutional. The
district court abstained, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed."' The
Ninth Circuit cited Pennzoil for the proposition that the Younger
doctrine should be applied to civil proceedings when the state's
interest in the proceeding is so important that exercise of the
federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the
states and the federal government."9 In this case, the state's in-
terest was the same as that argued in Pennzoil, i.e., administering
certain aspects of its judicial system. The court of appeals found
that any action by the federal trial court would have interfered with
an ongoing state proceeding that was being conducted in order to
enforce compliance with the state court's judgments.'
Another sample decision illustrates how subtle the precedential
influence of Pennzoil has been to date. In First Alabama Bank
of Montgomery v. Parsons Steel, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately
found that Younger abstention was not appropriate because there
was no important state interest presented in the case."' Basically,
the plaintiff defaulted on a note in favor of a bank. The bank
foreclosed under the terms of the security agreement. The plaintiff
sued the bank in state court, alleging that the bank had defrauded
him. Approximately two months later, plaintiff sued in federal
district court alleging that the same conduct that gave rise to the
suit under state law also violated relevant federal statutes. The
federal action was bifurcated and proceeded to a judgment before
the state action. The federal court found in favor of the bank.
The bank then returned to state court and argued that the state ac-
tion was barred by res judicata and moved for summary judgment.
The motion was denied by the state court and the court proceeded
to a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $4,000,000.
258. Id. at 811.
259. Id. at 814-15.
260. Id. at 815.
261. 825 F.2d 1475 (11th Cir. 1987).
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The bank then brought an injunction action in federal court seeking
to halt further prosecution of the state court action. The district
court granted the injunction, and the state court stayed the action.
One of the main issues before the Eleventh Circuit was
whether the district court should have abstained from enjoining an
ongoing state civil proceeding. The court of appeals curiously
concluded that the state court action did not implicate any impor-
tant state government interest. 2 Paradoxically, the court went on
to cite Middlesex County and gave somewhat short shrift to
Pennzoil. The court justified its holding by observing, "The State
action involved in this case was merely a private action between
private parties in which the State of Alabama had no interest
beyond 'its interest as adjudicator of wholly private disputes.' ,,9263
The court of appeals thus distinguished Pennzoil.2" This may be
precedential evidence of the narrow reading of Pennzoil. In
response to Justice Stevens's concurrence, the majority opinion in
Pennzoil invoked an "Our Federalism" distinction between the
state's interest in enforcing a verdict or judgment already rendered
from the more general, and presumably less important, state's in-
terest in the adjudication of wholly private disputes. The former
is particular and preserves already expended state judicial resour-
ces from being rendered a nullity or being wasted in a given case.
The latter is general and a generic police power for dispute resolu-
tion that is not even exclusive to the state.' The implication
from the Eleventh Circuit, therefore, was that Alabama's abstract
interest in resolving the private dispute was significantly less im-
portant than Texas's interest in preserving the integrity of its jury's
verdict and applicable state enforcement procedures.
A federal interest analysis in applying Younger abstention
principles was evident in the Third Circuit's analysis in Ford
Motor Co. v. Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania.2 Two
cases were consolidated for appeal. In each case, a declaratory
262. Id. at 1483.
263. Id. (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 n.12 (1987)).
264. Id.
265. Compare Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) with Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
266. 874 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1989).
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judgment action was brought in federal district court to challenge
a state statute on constitutional and federal preemption grounds.
In each case, the institution of state administrative proceedings to
revoke the federal plaintiff's licenses to sell insurance was fol-
lowed by a motion to dismiss in federal court on abstention
grounds. The Third Circuit determined that all three prongs of
the Middlesex County test had been met. 7 There was an ongoing
state proceeding, and the state had an important interest in regulat-
ing its insurance industry. Moreover, the court of appeals cited
Dayton Christian Schools for the proposition that "state ad-
ministrative proceedings that do not provide an opportunity for the
resolution of the claimant's constitutional contention, are adequate
for Younger abstention if the state's judicial review of the ad-
ministrative proceeding provides opportunity for a de novo hearing
of the constitutional claim." '2 Nevertheless, the court of appeals
determined that abstention was improper. The court of appeals
held that invocation of the supremacy clause "requires review of
the state interest to be served by abstention, in tandem with the
federal interest that is asserted to have usurped the state law....
'[T]he notion of "comity" embodied by the Younger doctrine is
"not strained when a federal court cuts off state proceedings that
entrench upon the federal domain." ' ,,269 Since the state statute
was unambiguous, and thus not subject to a narrowing construc-
tion, the "federal interest in insuring the unhindered enforcement
of federal law ' overrode the state interest. Although the Pennzoil
precedent did not figure prominently in the Third Circuit's analysis,
pre-emption cases may be the first area in which the analysis of
federal interests27 in Younger abstention will take hold.7
267. Id. at 932-33.
268. Id. at 932.
269. Id. at 934 (quoting Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1111, 1117 (3d Cir. 1986)).
270. Id.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 231-34.
272. The Third Circuit in Ford Motor Co. explained:
Although Pennsylvania's interest in the regulation of its insurance industry is sig-
nificant, there exists a countervailing significant federal interest in insuring the
unhindered enforcement of federal law. Balancing these interests in the present
cases, we are persuaded that the scales weigh decidedly in favor of federal in-
tervention so that the federal courts could determine the extent to which [40 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 641 (Purdon 1987 Supp.)] had been preempted.
874 F.2d 926, 934 (3d Cir. 1989).
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One last court of appeals decision, also from the Third Circuit,
deserves attention. In Schall v. Joyce,273 a debtor brought suit in
federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the state's
procedures for confession of judgment. The plaintiff sought a dec-
laratory judgment and a temporary restraining order to prevent a
sheriff's sale of her home pursuant to a confession of judgment
which had been obtained in an ex parte state court proceeding.
At the hearing for the temporary restraining order, the district court
directed the plaintiff to go to state court to seek a stay of the
sheriff's sale and to try to open or to strike the confessed judgment
entered against her in state court. The state court stayed the ex-
ecution of the judgment; therefore, the district court denied the
temporary restraining order.
The federal defendant then filed a motion to dismiss. The dis-
trict court issued a stay pending resolution of the state court
proceedings, but did not explain its reasoning. The plaintiff ap-
pealed. While the federal appeal was pending, the state court
opened the state judgment that had been entered against the plain-
tiff. The Third Circuit first analyzed the district court's stay. The
court of appeals found that the purpose of "[the district court's]
stay was 'to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to
be litigated in a state forum.' ,274 Therefore, the stay was a final,
appealable abstention orderY5
The appellees argued that the Younger abstention doctrine
obliged an affirmance of the district court's order, and the court
of appeals agreed. 6  Applying the Middlesex County test, the
court quickly dispensed with the first and third prongs.2" The
"difficult question" was "[wihether the state proceedings implicate
an important state interest." '278 In determining this issue, the court
273. 885 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1989).
274. Id. at 105 quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1983).
275. Compare Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1 (1983) (order granting stay is appealable) with Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988) (order denying stay is not appealable). See
generally Baker, Toward A Unified Theory of the Jurisdiction of the United States Courts
of Appeals, 39 DE PAUL L. Rnv. 235, 266-68 (1990).
276. 885 F.2d at 102, 106 n.1.
277. Id. at 106-07.
278. 885 F.2d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 1989).
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of appeals found that the Pennzoil decision was directly on point:
"In both cases, the parties sought relief in federal court after a
judgment had been entered, and in both cases, the relief sought in
the federal court would have rendered nugatory, at least to some
extent, the effect that the state court judgment would ordinarily
have had under state law." '279
The court found appellant's attempts to distinguish Pennzoil
unpersuasive. The fact that the confession of judgment was
rendered ex parte provided "no basis for concluding that the state's
interest in it is weaker than the state's interest in a judgment after
a hearing. In both .cases, the state has seen fit to make its full
power available to execute the judgment."' The fact that the
case involved a request for declaratory relief did not distinguish
Pennzoil, since a declaratory judgment would have had the same
effect on the state court proceeding as an injunction. Moreover,
the Supreme Court's holding in Steffel v. Thompson"--declaratory
relief is appropriate when no state proceeding is pending prior to
the initiation of the federal suit-was found inapplicable in Schall
because "[tihe Supreme Court has clearly stated that a case which
has proceeded to judgment is still pending for Younger purposes
as long as appellate remedies have not been exhausted." 2 There-
fore, according to the Third Circuit, "the fact that the state court
has subsequently opened the judgment by confession does not
relieve the federal courts of a duty to abstain."" Finally, the fact
that the plaintiff had made a formal motion for class certification
did not distinguish Pennzoil, because the plaintiff in Pennzoil
could also have obtained class certification, and the court of ap-
peals felt "confident that such a motion would not have changed
the result in Pennzoil."
The issues in Schall closely parallel those in Pennzoil; there-
fore, Schall contributes a great deal toward understanding the
scope of Pennzoil as a precedent. The Third Circuit found that
critical to the determination of Pennzoil was " 'the importance to
279. Id. at 109.
280. Id.
281. 415 U.S. 452 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
282. 885 F.2d at 110.
283. 885 F.2d 101, 110 (3d Cir. 1989).
284. Id. at 111.
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the States of enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts.' "
Based on this measure, the court of appeals determined that
"Pennzoil bars a federal court from granting relief from unconsti-
tutional state court civil proceedings only in cases in which the
federal relief would render the state court's orders or judgments
nugatory, as long as the other two Middlesex prongs are satisfied
and there are no exceptional circumstances." 6 Citing the Court's
footnote in Pennzoil to the effect that Younger abstention is not
" 'always appropriate whenever a civil proceeding is pending in a
state court,' " the court of appeals read Pennzoil to say:
the ... principle that the state's interest in litigation initiated
by private persons is less weighty than other state interests
protected by Younger may still have some room to operate, as
it suggests that the federal courts may, in an appropriate case,
interfere with an ongoing privately initiated state proceeding in
which the state court has not yet rendered judgment even if
Younger would preclude such interference in a case in which
the state had already entered judgment." 7
The court of appeals majority's response to the dissenting
judge also is of interest. The dissent attempted to limit Pennzoil
to its facts and asserted that the majority opinion left "only the
proverbial needle's eye in which to find Younger inapplicable." '288
Yet the majority rejected assertions that the size of the judgment
and the greater time and effort involved in the state proceedings
in Pennzoil distinguished it. 9 Responding to the dissent's argu-
ment that the majority opinion could "be used to support absten-
tion almost any time related suits are pending in state and federal
courts[,]" 2 ° the majority observed:
The presence of two parallel law suits and the prospect of a
race to judgment does not run afoul of Younger. What runs
afoul of Younger, if each of the three Middlesex prongs is met
and absent exceptional circumstances, is for a defendant in state
court who has had a judgment entered against her.., to decline
285. Id. at 108 quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 107 U.S. 1, 13 (1987).
286. Id. (emphasis added).
287. Id. at 109 (emphasis added) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1,
14 n.12 (1987)).
288. 885 F.2d 101, 115 (3d Cir. 1989) (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 111.
290. Id. at 114.
354 [Vol. 9:303
OUR FEDERALISM
to pursue available state remedies such as an appeal or a motion
to open the judgment but go instead into federal court to have
the state judgment entered against her declared void.29'
This statement appears to say nothing more than that the Younger-
Pennzoil doctrine, as applied to civil cases, does not extend as far
as in criminal cases. The institution of state court proceedings in
which the constitutionality of a state criminal law is at issue is
automatically a ground for Younger abstention in the federal court.
According to Schall, a similar suit instituted in state court involv-
ing the constitutionality of a state civil statute does not automat-
ically require federal court abstention.'
The precedent in Pennzoil seems to have had the effect of in-
creasing the invocations of the Younger abstention doctrine. This
is particularly so with respect to the extended radiant of state civil
suits. Its influence on the outcomes of those analyses is less cer-
tain, at least on a preliminary view. If nothing else, this sampling
suggests that the Pennzoil opinion is the new starting point of
analysis for Younger abstention issues in civil cases.
IV. Conclusion
The basic analytical weakness in the Younger abstention
doctrine has to do with Justice Black's ill-conceived attempt in
1971 to resolve irrevocably the ever-present and ever-changing is-
sues of federalism by invoking the vague slogan "Our Federalism."
This slogan has allowed for an expansion of the doctrine beyond
its rationale. More seriously, its static definition basically miscon-
ceives the dual system of state and federal courts: "Federal and
state powers ebb and flow relative to one another in response to
messy and mutable social, political, and economic conditions.
They cannot be contained by a formula, least of all a rigid one."' 93
Abstention doctrine has provided mixed results in the cases
and has received mixed reviews from commentators.' Has it had
291. Id. at 112.
292. See supra Subpart I1(A).
293. Soifer & Macgill, supra note 71, at 1168; see also P. FnKLEMAN, AN Impewr
Uo,N: SAvERY, FEDEWISM AND Com'Y 4 (1981) ("Comity" is the "courtesy or considera-
tion that one jurisdiction gives by enforcing the laws of another, granted out of respect
and deference rather than obligation.")
294. See Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 605 (1981); Redish, supra note 74; Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion,
60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985).
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much effect? One recent law review effort at a statistical study
to quantify the doctrine concluded that "Younger and the other
abstention doctrines are not foreclosing federal courts from hearing
significant numbers of § 1983 or Bivens actions."295  This con-
clusion, of course, must be qualified to note that these Supreme
Court precedents may have a profound ex ante effect that dis-
courages plaintiffs from filing their claims in state court. Further-
more, this conclusion was quantitative, not qualitative. However,
federal jurisdiction is also qualitative. This explains the recom-
mendations of a recent empirical study conducted by the Commit-
tee on Federal Courts of the New York Bar Association:2
1. Federal courts should pay greater attention to the Supreme
Court's command that abstention be invoked only under "ex-
ceptional circumstances," particularly in civil and administrative
cases.
2. When there is a need to resolve a novel, unclear issue of
state law, federal courts should consider using the New York
certification procedures, rather than abstaining, because the cer-
tification procedure is less likely to cause undue delay, and the
federal court maintains primary jurisdiction over the case.
3. When deciding whether abstention should be invoked, the
district court should hold a hearing at which the following is-
sues should be carefully considered, in addition to traditional
abstention criteria:
a) the anticipated duration of the state court proceeding;
b) whether any delay seriously prejudices the federal rights in-
volved;
c) the degree of preclusive effect of the state court determina-
tion on the federal claims;
295. Note, supra note 61, at 859.
296. After examining the Second Circuit's post-Younger abstention holdings, the Com-
mittee found that
(a) The risk that abstention will have the practical effect of frustrating or unduly
delaying the adjudication of federal claims appears to be greatest in cases in-
volving federal claims arising from administrative proceedings and asserted in
civil disputes of a Classwide or institutional nature.(b) Particularly in those cases, the federal courts should carefully weigh such
risks against the objectives which might be achieved by abstention.
(c) Federal courts should also, assess whether abstention might actually result in
more rather than less litigation, of longer duration, and whether piecemeal litiga-
tion might be engendered.
New York State Bar Ass'n, Report of the Committee on Federal Courts-The Abstention
Doctrine: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings,
122 F.R.D. 89, 106 (1988); see also Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences
of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings-A Response to Professor
Stravitz, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 173 (1989).
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d) the impact of a state forum on litigants' ability to maintain
class litigation where appropriate;
e) the probable familiarity of state courts with the federal law
in question; and
f) other factors which may be present in the particular case,
bearing on whether the state courts are as competent at deciding
federal questions and related facts in the first instance as are
the federal courts.
4. An abstaining federal court should generally stay, rather
than dismiss, the federal action in order to insure that the
federal courthouse door remains open and fully accessible to the
federal plaintiff.
5. In appropriate cases, the abstaining federal court should con-
sider granting interim equitable relief to insure the protection
of federal rights while the issues are resolved in the state court
proceeding.2
These recommendations should be the tactical focus of litigators
embroiled in a dispute involving the Younger abstention doctrine.
This Article has been an academic effort to get behind the en-
cysted phrase "Our Federalism"-to get the reader to think about
the idea of federalism. 2 ' Federalism cannot "mean all things to
all people."' The Younger line of cases down to Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc. recognizes a "recrudescent federalism" in which
state courts are viewed as primary guardians of individual rights.3"°
It remains to be seen how much Pennzoil will carry forward this
view. Perhaps the only certain aspect of the underlying federalism
in the long run may be an inherent uncertainty:
The question of the relation of the States to the federal govern-
ment cannot, indeed, be settled by the opinion of any one
generation, because it is a question of growth, and every suc-
cessive stage of our political and economic development gives
it a new aspect, makes it a new question. 0'
297. New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 296, at 106-07.
298. See Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 1141 (1988);
Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests on the Law of Federal Courts, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 499 (1989).
299. Baker, The History and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy Requirement: A
Proposal to "Up the Ante" in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.R.D. 299, 317 (1984); see
also Amar, supra note 73, at 1425.
300. Baker, supra note 83, at 848.
301. W. WELSON, CONsmrrrtIoNAL Govammw iN nm UNrrED STATES 173 (1908).
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